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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. B. RUSSELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND 
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the plaintiff in the above entitled cause 
and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a 
re-hearing in this cause, for the reasons and upon the 
follo~ng grounds: 
I 
The Court erred in holding that the lower court had 
no jurisdiction to order the plaintiff's reinstatement 
with defendant company with senority rights unim-
paired. 
II 
The Court erred in holding that the statements in 
the transcript relating to plaintiff's illness were hear-
say, and should not have been considered by the court 
as substantive evidenee of such illness. 
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III 
The Court erred in holding that the transcript was 
improperly considered by the court as the exclusive 
evidence of the facts therein testified to. 
IV 
The Court erred in holding that the lower court 
erred in rejecting defendant's evidence, offered at the 
trial, that plaintiff was not in fact ill. 
v 
The Court erred in holding that the provision of 
the contract 
''No Yardman will he suspended or dismissed 
(without first having a fair and impartial hear-
ing and bis guilt established'' 
did not require the establishment of guilt at the hearing 
in order to justify discharg-e. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
The fact ~bat we are here confronted by a Court 
united against the position of our client places a double 
responsibility upon us as his attorneys. First, the 
responsibility of doing our best to protect the interests 
of our client. In this we have a present feeling of 
having failed miserably. Seeond, the responsibility of 
treading the narrow margin between respect for the 
court's opinions and honorable disagreement therewith. 
The Court has stated that it would be "a travesty 
on justiee'' to permit the plaintiff to recover substantial 
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damages in this action. This obviously by reason of 
the fact that the Court is convinced that "good cause" 
for discharge in fac.t here existed. This point we are 
not disposed here to argue, because the question of 
"~hether good cause for discharge did in fact exist is 
not in this cas9. This case hinges upon the sole question 
of 'Yhether in the determination of the existence of 
cause for discharg·e the defendant complied with its 
contractual oblig·ations to the plaintiff. What we· here 
seek is a reconsideration by the Court of the single 
question of whPther this plaintiff was accorded his con-
tractual rights, that is, was Rule 38 of the contract 
complied with. 
The language of the rule is as follows: 
''Article 8, Rule 38. No yardman will · be 
suspendfd or dismissed without first having a 
fair and impartial hearing and his guilt estab-
lished. The man whose case is under consider-
ation may be represented by an employee of his 
choice, who may be a committeeman, who will be 
permittE;d to interrogate witnesses. The accused 
and his representative shall be permitted to hear 
the testimony of witnesses.'' 
We emphasize the phrase 
''The accused and his representative shall be 
permitted to hear the testimony of witnesses.'' 
for the reason that it is completely ignored by the Court 
in its decision, and we cannot help but believe that it 
was overlooked. In fact, in quoting the rule in the 
opinion, this portion thereof is indicated only by a series 
of dots. 
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The rule on its fac.e requires, so far as we are here 
coneerned, five conditions to proper discharge: 
(1) A fai1· and impartial hearing; 
(2) The right to be represented; 
(3) The right to interrogate witnesses; 
( 4) The right to hear the testimony of the witnesses; 
(5) The establishment of his guilt. 
It is upon this question alone that we seek recon-
sideration. If these conditions existed prior to dis· 
charge it would indeed be a travesty on justice to pe-rmit 
his recovery. 
On the other hand, if they did not, it would be, and 
is a· travesty on justice to deny him his rights under the 
contract, solemnly entered into by the· Depot Company 
on the one hand, and the representative of the mass of 
employees on the other, for the benefit of all who come 
within its terms. 
The decision herein is not limited in scope to the 
rights of this single individual.. It lays down a pattern 
which affects the employment rights of large numbers. 
The blessing here given by the court to the methods 
here employed in applying Rule 38 is of concern to 
many persons. We respectfully urge that further con-
sideration be given to the meaning of Rule 38, to the 
end that not only this plaintiff be accorded the benefit 
of its proper interpretation, but an interpretation be 
given comme~surate with the rights of all the other 
employees subject thereto. 
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For convenience our views will be presented under 
tw·o points of argument: 
(1) The Court erred in holding that the· lower court 
had no jurisdiction to order the plaintiff's rein-
statement \Yith defendant Company with sen-
iority rights unimpaired. 
(:3) The Court erred in holding that it was for the 
trial rourt to determine whether the· grounds 
for digcharge in fact existed, and in this deter .. 
ruination it was not limited to the transcript of 
the heHring·. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE, COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO 
ORDER THE PLAINTIFF'S REINSTATEMENT 
WITH DEFENDANT COMPANY WITH SEN-
IORITY RIGHTS UNIMP AIRE~D. 
Insofar as this case is concerned, what the Court 
does on this particular phase of the matter is of little 
consequence. However, as a matter· of general policy 
we respectfully question the propriety of this holding. 
In the lower eourt the plaintiff sought reinstate-
ment. The lov1er court ruled against him on this point. 
He did not appeal from this ruling. The correctness 
of this ruling was not before this court for approval 
or disapproval. In fact, the plaintiff carefully avoided 
being drawn into any controversy in this court over the 
question of whether the court as a matter of law had 
or had not jurisdiction to reinstate. 
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In view of this situation it seems that this court 
might well await the time when this question comes 
before it on appeal before taking the momentous step 
of judicially determining that the courts of Utah are 
without jurisdiction to order reinstatement under agree-
ments such as these, rather than so to hold in this pro-
ceeding without benefit of argument pro and con. Other 
courts have taken a contrary view. 
Coyle v. Erie Ry. Co. (N.J.) 63 A. 2d 702. 
Fine v. Plat (Tex.) 150 S.W. 2d 308. 
Heasley v. Plasterers' Local No. 31 (Pa .. ) 188 A. 
286. 
Locomotive Engineers v. Mills (Ariz.) 31 P. 2d 971. 
As indicated, these particular observations are of 
no moment insofar as the plaintiff is concerned, as he 
is bound in this case by the holding of the lower court. 
They are purely gratuitous with us, as attorneys, and 
directed toward what we conceive to be an erroneous 
position upon a point that need not here be decided . 
. II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT 
WAS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DETER-
MINE WJIEiTHER THE GROUNDS FOR DIS-
CHARGE IN FACT EXISTED, AND IN THIS 
DETERMINATION IT WAS NOT LIMITED TO 
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING. 
We approach this assignment upon the assumption 
that the court agrees that the requirement for filling 
out Form 153 does not apply in the case of an absence 
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occasioned by illness; and, hence, if illness were the 
cause of the extended absence, a failure- to eomply with 
Rule 55(b) Hlh1 fill out the form would not justify a 
discharge. The reverse of the proposition is that if 
the cause of the absence 'Yere not illness that the defend-
ant had the right to discharge him for his failure to 
comply 'Yith th.J rule. 
We also observe that the court likewise agreed that 
the burden of proving the propriety of the discharge 
is on the defendant. 
Our position, briefly and bluntly stated, is that if 
Rule 38 was complied with prior to discharge, the de-
fendant's right of discharge is full and complete. If 
Rule 38 was not complied with, the discharge was wrong-
ful. The court's position, as we interpret the opinion, 
is that the right of discharge is dependent upon the 
existence in fact of the ground for discharge assigned, 
and this is a matter to be determined by the court.· 
This latter view disregards, as we see it, the fact that 
the parties themselves contracted the conditions for 
discharge, and having so contracted it is for the court 
only to determine whether those conditions existed -
neither adding conditions, nor subtracting conditions. We 
look, accordingly, to Rule 38, as follows: 
''No yardman will be suspended or dismissed 
without first having a fair and impartial hearing 
and his guilt established. The man whose· case 
is under consideration may be represented by an 
employee of his choice, who may be a committee-
man, who will he permitted to interrogate wit-
nesses. The accused and his representative shall 
be permj ted to hear the testimony of witnesses.'' 
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The first ten words are of pnmary importance. 
They are: 
''No yardman will be suspended or dismissed 
without first having * * *. '' 
Now what must he "first" have before he may be dis-
charged~ Five things are named, (1) a fair and im- . 
partial hearinp-; (2) the right of representation; (3) 
the right to interrogate witnesses; ( 4) the right to 
hear the testimony of the witnesses; ( 5) the establish-
ment of his guilt. 
If those five conditions existed the discharge is 
proper. If any thereof did not exist the discharge is 
improper. This case is just that simple, and the sole 
duty of the court is to determine whether those five 
conditions did exist prior to the discharge. And where 
does it go to make that determination~ Of necessity it 
must go to the record made prior to discharge, and not 
to some record, or to some evidence, or to some wit-
nesses first appearing on the scene after discharge, 
because those conditions must first exist before a dis-
charge is proper. 
Thus it is that we urge that the record of the hear-
ing is the best, and in fact the only evidence of whether 
those conditions did exist. Anything less makes a 
mockery of the provisions of the Rule. If the employer 
may simply pay lip service to the rule by holding a 
so-called hearing at which it withholds its evidence, and 
after the hearing is closed, secretly interrogate its 
witnesses, and develop grounds for discharge (which 
admittedly is "'·hat here occurred if there is any evidence 
contrary to that appearing In the transcript) then at 
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least four of the conditions necessary to discharge do not 
exist. The employee has not had a fair and impartial 
hearing·; he has not had an opportunity to interrogate 
the ·witnesses; he has not been permitted to hear the 
testimony of \Yitnesses; and his guilt has not been 
established at the hearing-. 
\\T e turn n O"\Y to some decisions which we believe 
support our views. 
The "\Yord hearing· has been variously defined, but 
running- through all of the decisions is the idea that a 
hearing· includes the opportunity to hear as well as 
to be heard. In Anthony v. Gilbrath (Ill.) 71 N.E. 2d 184 
the court held : 
''Hearing is generally understood to mean 
a judicial examination of the issues between 
the parties whether of law or fact.'' 
In State v. Milw·aukee (Wis.) 147 N. W. 50, the 
court had to decide what was meant by the word ''hear-
ing", and it ruled as follows: 
''There are at least three substantial ele-
ments of a common-law hearing, (1) the right 
to reasonably know the charges or claims pre-
ferred, (2) the right to meet such charges by 
competent evidence, and (3) the right to be heard 
by counsel upon the probative force of the evi-
dence a·iduced by both sides. * * . '' 
And in Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 109 F. 2d 9: 
''A hearing means trial by a tribunal free 
of bias and prejudice and imbued with a desire 
to accord to the parties equal consideration". 
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In the case of United States v. Appalachian Electric 
Pow'er Co., 107 F. 2d 769, the government attempted to 
enjoin the defendant from the erection of a hydro-
electric dam. As a part of the action it was maintained 
that the Commission had ruled against the plaintiff as 
a result of a hearing. The Court, at page 792, said: 
''If the public hearing granted by the Com-
mission in 1926 and above referred to is to be 
regarded as a. hearing in the sense of due process, 
and therefore the defendant is to be affected by 
the finding of the Commission that the interests 
of interstate commerce would be affected by the 
,dam, we could hardly conclude that the finding 
was based on substantial evidence, in view of the 
fact that the only evidence then introduced was 
the report and opinion of Gen. Taylor to the con-
trary. At the hearing counsel for the defendant 
inquired whether further or other evidence was 
to be considered hy the Commission, and if so, 
indicated his desire to be informed of it. Nothing 
was then said to indicate that the Commission 
desired or would eonsider other evidence. It is 
now said by counsel for the Commission that 
it did have available, and must have considered, 
other information upon the subject to he found 
in various official reports, public documents, 
and Acts of Congress, many of which were of-
fered in evidence by the plaintiff in this case. 
But as these matters were not brought to the 
attention of the Company at the hearing, it is 
not pereeived how they could he regarded as 
evidence affecting it in the sense of due pro-
cess. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lou-
isville & Nashville Railroad Co., 227 U.S. 88, 
91, 33, S. Ct., 185, 57 L.Ed. 431: Morgan v. United 
States, 304 U. S. 1, 14, 15, 19, 58 S. Ct. 773, 99, 
82 L.Ed 1129. For the same reasons we do not 
think that the subsequent declaration or finding 
10 
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of the Commission on October 12, 1932, can be 
reg·arded as in any \Yay affecting the rights of the 
defendant, because it was made ex parte without 
notice or hearing. It is not meant to suggest that 
the Commission at any time intentionally pro-
ceeded arbitrarily, or without proper regard to 
the rights of the Dam Company, or that its pro-
ceeding· \Yas inappropriate to the 'investigation' 
directed by the Act; but only that its finding, to 
the extent based on information obtained in-
formally and ex parte, and not brought out at 
the notified hearing where it would be subject 
to cross--examination and possible refutation, can-
not properly he considered as consistent with due 
process, if sought to he made conclusive on the 
defendant. The reasonable assumption would 
seem to be that the procedure followed was adop-
ted as appropriate to an 'investigation' by the 
Commission, rather than a 'hearing' 'vith the 
legal implications thereof. See Norwegian Nit-
rogen Products Company v. United States, 288 
U. S. 294, 317, 53 S. Ct., 350, 77 L. Ed. 796-." 
In Coyle v. Erie Ry. Co. (N. J.), 63 A. 2d 702 the 
court had before it a contractual provision that did not 
contain a provision for a hearing, but it did contain a 
provision permitting the employee to examine the evi-
dence of the employer. The. New Jersey court said: 
''Although the language of the quoted rule 
does not provide for a hearing in the technical 
sense of a court proceeding, there can he no 
doubt that the terms of the rule were not com-
plied wii h. The provision for notice 'in writing, 
in advance, of the charge and time of investiga-
tion' coupled with 'the right to be represented 
by the duly accredited representative' clearly 
11 
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imply such notices will give the employees a fair 
opportunity to get in touch with their repre-
sentatives and to prepare their defense. The 
one day'[~ notice given on October 15th to appear 
on October 16th is obviously inadequate. Schlenk 
v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, 62 A. 2d 
380, 381, decided by this court in an opinion filed 
December 6, 1948, not yet officially reported. The 
statements of Hastings and Whaley were read 
to the complainants, but neither was present 
despite the fact that the complainants asked 
why H~.stings was not there. They obviously 
desired to question Hastings and it would seem 
that thty were fairly entitled to do so either 
under the contract provision giving them the 
right to 'have witnesses of their own choice * * * 
p-resent or under the clause providing that 
'evidence pertaining to the case will be made 
available'. The defendant railroad has failed 
to comply with the terms of the contract with the 
Brotherhood in the investigation.'' 
The court then concluded: 
''The decree below will be reversed and a 
judgment will he entered, directing the rein-
statement of the complainants as of October 11, 
1947, 'vith back pay, retirement and pension 
rights, and enjoining the defendant from con-
ducting an investigation of the charges against 
the complainants except in conformity with the 
terms of the Brotherhood contract.'' 
A related field of inquiry is found in cases growing 
out of the discharge of employees covered by civil ser-
vice statutes. The distinction, which is without a legal 
difference, is that there the statutes condition the right 
of discharge, whereas here the contract sets forth those 
-c.onditions. 
12 
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\\.,.. e refer, for example, to the case of Roberson v. 
City of Rome (Ga.) 25 S. E. 2d 925: 
"It is evident that the hearing contemplated 
by the act is not a common-law or a criminal 
proceeding. But while it is not a common-law or 
criminal proceeding it is of a judicial character 
and must be so conducted. Stiles v. Lowell, 233 
Mass. 17 4, 123 N.E~. 615, 4 A.L.R. 1365; State v. 
~IcColl, 127 ~linn. 155, 149, N.W. 11. The power of 
the Civil Service Board of the City of Rome is de-
rived from the act creating it, and it has no power 
not granted by the act, and in performing the 
functions it must do so in terms of the act. 'The 
full performace of all conditions established by 
the civil service laws is an essential prerequisite 
to the jurisdiction of the removing body over 
the subject matter of the removal of an officer 
(citing Stiles v. L·owell, supra, and Thomas v 
Lowell, 227 Mass. 116, 116 N. E. 497), and w·here 
there is no substantial compliance with the sta-
tutory procedure, an order of removal is a ri!Ul-
lity.' 43 C. J. 679." (Italics added) 
And Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners., 
(Calif.) 160 P 2d 816, the court said: 
''The rule is firmly established that if by 
statute an officer or civil service employee may 
not be removed or discharged except for cause, 
the clear implication is that there be afforded 
an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish 
his removal; that unless the statute expressly 
negatives the necessity of a hearing, common 
fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such 
a requirement hy implication. See Bannerman 
v. Boyle. 160 Cal. 197, 116 P. 732; Carrol v. Cali-
fornia Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal. 2d 164, 105 
P. 2d 110; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641, 119 P. 
13 
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1080; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79 
Cal. App. 383, 249 P. 539; People v. Bailey, 30 
Cal App. 581, 158 P. 1036; Scott v. Donahue, 83 
Cal. .App. 126. 269 P. 455; Abrams v. Daugherty, 
60 Cal. App. 297, 212 P. 942; Boyd v. Pendegast, 
57 Cal. App. 504, 207 P. 713; 99 A. L. R. 336. 
Thus it is clear that the charter, hy prohibiting 
removal except for cause, impliedly requires a 
hearing. There is nothing in the charter which 
negatives that implication. True, it is provided 
in section 112 (a) that the board shall investi-
gate the grounds for discharge. But an investi-
gation is not necessarily inconsistent with a hear-
ing. It may mean the same thing. See Luellen 
v. City of Aberdeen, 20 Wash. 2594, 148, 148 P. 
2d 849; Matter of Gilchrist, 130 Misc. 456, 224 
N. Y. S. 210." 
'' * * *. The term investigation does not de-
tract from the fact that a hearing is required 
with all that the term implies.'' 
The· Utah Civil Service Statute (Seetion 15-9-21, 
U. C. A., 1943) provides: 
''All persons in the classified civil service 
may . he removed from office or employment by 
·the head of the department for mis-conduct, in-
competency or failure to perform his duties or 
failure to observe properly the rules of the de-
partment, but subject to appeal by the aggrieved 
party to the civil service commission. .Any per-
son discharged may 'vithin five days from the 
issuing by· the head of the department of the 
order discharging him appeal therefrom to the 
civil service commission; which shall fully bear 
and determine the matter. The discharged per-
son shall be entitled to appear in person and to 
have counsel and a public hearing. The finding 
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and decision of the civil service commission upon 
such hearing shall be certified to the head of the 
departrrtent from 'vhose order the appeal is taken, 
and shall be final, and shall forth,vith be enforced 
and follo,ved by him.'' 
In the case of Erkman .. v. Civil Service Commission, 
114 Utah ~:28, 198 P. 2d 238, this court had no difficulty 
in confining the court to the record before the Com-
mission, and held: 
'·The judgment of the Distric.t Court was 
based s )lely on the record of the hearing before 
the Civi: Service Commission on plaintiff's ap-
peal to that commission from his discharge by 
the Chief of Police. Since our action on this ap-
peal 'vill likewise be based altogether on that 
same r~cord, we may treat this for the purpose 
of simpHcity as if it were a direct appeal from 
the defendant eommission to this eourt, although 
technically the question before us is whether the 
district court erred in refusing to set aside the 
order of the defendant commission. But that 
question depends upon whether the defendant 
commission failed regularly to pursue its author~ 
ity, or, in other words, whether it acted arbit-
rarily, or, stated still another way, without basis 
or reason.'' 
And finally we refer to the case of Buster v. M. & 
St. P. & P. R. Co., 195 F. (2) 73, wherein the plaintiff 
sued for damages for a claimed improper discharge. 
The contractual provision there involved was not dis-
similar from ours. It read: 
''Defendant's yardman or switch tenders 
taken out of service or censored for eause shall 
be notified by the company of the reason therefor 
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and shall he given a hearing within five days 
after being taken out of service. * * * yardmen 
* * * shall have the right to be present and to have 
an employee of their choice at hearings and 
investip:ations to hear all oral and read all writ-
ten testimony and bring out any facts in connec-
tion with the case. '' 
On appeal, the Illinois court held: 
'' r~rhe sole question involved in this appeal 
is whether or not the plaintiff was given a 'fair 
and impartial hearing' on the charge that he 
viola ted the company rules.'' 
That, in a sense, is the point we are here making. 
As evidenced by the foregoing decisions, the view of the 
.courts is that' fi "fair and impartial hearing" implies 
.the right to hear, the right to be heard, the right to exa-
. mine witnesses, the right to have the witnesses present, 
the right to be apprised of the evidence against him, and 
the· right to argue its probative force. 
In the present contract it was not, in part at least, 
left to any implication to he drawn from the word hear-
ing, because, in addition to providing for a "fair and 
impartial hearing'' with all of its implications, Rule 
38 specifically spelled out what the parties had in mind, 
namely, the right to interrogate the witnesses, the right 
. to have the employee's guilt established. 
This court in its opinion says : 
"It is true that in a proper cases the trans-
cript of the hearing might itself reveal unjust 
discharge. Thus, if it showed conclusively that 
the plaintiff was not accorded his rights under 
the eon tract; that he was not given adequate 
notice, or was not given opportunity to be heard 
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or to be represented by an employee of his choice, 
the discharge ""'ould be wrongful, because ac-
cording the employee such rights is, under the 
rontract, a condition precedent to discipline or 
discharge. But that is not the ease before us.'' 
\\T e eannot reeoncile that holding with the ultimate 
decision. Here it is established that the plaintiff was 
discharged upon the basis of evidence not adduced at 
the hearing - t~at the defendant accepted and acted 
upon testimony or statements of witnesses made outside 
the hearing - that the plaintiff was never apprised of 
the nature of the evidenee or who gave it - and that 
he \Yas not given an opportunity to refute it or argue 
its probative fC'rce. 
Wherein is there a fair and impartial hearing in 
that type of p~oceeding~ Wherein is there any comp-
liance of the rule that requires, as a condition to dis-
charge, that the employee shall have the right to inter-
rogate the witnesses and be permitted to hear their 
testimony~ 
The court recognizes that the transcript of the 
hearing on its face may show improper discharg·e, as 
where he was not given adequate notice, or an opport-
unity to be heard, or to be represented by an employee 
of his choice. But why so limit it~ The parties them-
selves did not. They further provided that the employee 
at the hearing should have the right to interrogate the 
witnesses and hear the evidence against him. Why is 
it less important that he know the evidence against him 
than that he be represented by a fellow employee~ Why 
is it less important to the employee that witnesses be 
permitted to testify against him in secret than it is 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that he have adequate notiee of the hearing~ Aren't 
all of these c.onditions equally important, and actually 
if an.y are absent hasn't the employee had less than a 
fair and impartial hearing~ We can't conceive that 
this Court intends to hold that the requirements for 
a fair and impartial hearing are met where evidence 
against the employee is developed and determined 1n 
secret, and a discharge predieated thereon. 
Neither does it suffice to say that the trial court 
will eorrect the matter if injustice was done and the 
employee discharged when no grounds therefore existed. 
The injustiee arises through the breach of the c.ondit-
ions of the contract, which provides that no employee 
shall be discharged until he first shall have a fair 
and impartial hearing, etc. If the employer can first 
discharge, and then try out de novo in the courts the 
question of the propriety of the diseharge, the provi-
sions of Rule 38 are meaningless and the benefits to 
the employee intended thereby nonexistent. Certainly 
neither the employees nor the employer who negotiated 
this contract intended any such result, nor can the lan-
guage· they used justify any such interpretation. 
To some extent the responsibility for what we be-
lieve to be the erroneous interpretation of Rule 38 may 
lie with us for our oversight in our original brief in 
omitting to set forth the whole of Rule 38, rather than 
stopping with the words "and his guilt established". 
However, the whole of the rule appeared in the defend-
ant's ·brief, including that portion relating to the right 
to interrogate witnesses and hear the testimony of 
witnesses, which we now deem of particular importance, 
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in vie"~ of the apparent holding of the court that the 
right to a ''fair and impartial hearing'' in and of itself 
does not include these latter rights. 
Our only explanation for this dereliction is that it 
never occurred to us that this court would hold that the 
plaintiff had had a fair and impartial hearing, where 
there \Yas a taking- of evidence against him in secret 
and the predicating of his discharge on that secret evi-
dence. It is not, ho\YeYer, too late to right the wrong, 
and reg·ardless of what this court may say in regard to 
what constitutes a. fair hearing·, the contract here spelled 
out in black and white that before the plaintiff could be 
discharged he would have the right to hear and see the 
,,~itnesses against him, and admittedly this right wa.s not 
accorded him. 
On the question of the measure of damages we yield 
in this case ,,jthout further argument. However, we 
believe that th~ right to back pay is inextricably woven 
in to the right to reinstatement, and that they go hand 
in glove. In other words, if there is the right to rein-
statement, and jurisdiction to grant it, there is a co-
equal right to hack pay, and as heretofore indicated, 
we trust the court will not in this case foreclose the mat-
ter of the court's jurisdiction to order reinstatement, 
because the pro of the proposition has not been ade-
quately presented or argued. 
One other matter, and then we are going to fold 
our tent. The Court apparently gives considerable 
importance to the fact· that the agent for plaintiff in 
his bids for reinstatement finally himself concluded 
that plaintiff had testified falsely as to his illness. We 
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cannot help but believe that in so holding the court 
has reached the same tortured conclusion as to the mean-
ing of Mr. McDaniel's letter as the defendant asserted; 
but, regardless of that, there are two complete answers 
to the conclusion which we believe the court has over-
looked. The first is that if the agent did become so 
convinced it must have been upon that same secret testi-
-mony which is the nub of this whole law suit. 
The second is, that McDaniel's whole interest in 
this matter was in regard to reinstatement. McDaniel 
never came int., the matter at all except insofar as plain-
tiff's request that he be· reinstated was being processed 
by the defendant. The letter on its face relates to 
reinstatment alone. We do not now· care about rein ... 
statement. WP: gave up on that when the trial court 
ruled against us. Yet despite the fact that reinstate-
ment is not and never has been involved in this appeal, 
we are constantly c.onfronted with its apparition, and 
the defendant's denial to plaintiff of a fair and impar-
tial hearing is blessed by the reminder that he had no 
right to reinstatement. 
We sincere]y wish that the court would throw the 
question of reinstatement out the window - discard it 
permanently insofar as this case is concerned, onee and 
for all - and decide the plaintiff's rights as we believe 
they should be decided, solely upon the question of 
' whether the defendant breached its contract in not first 
complying with Rule 38 before making the discharge 
effective. upon this issue, which is and can be the only 
pertinent one, questions of whether the plaintiff was 
a liar or not, of whether he was a good worker or a poor 
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one, of ""hether he should in fact have been discharged 
for a dozen different reasons, become immaterial. There 
may baYe been a hundred good reasons for dismissing· 
him from ser,~iee, but the defendant contracted with him 
that before ·it 'Would discharge him it would give- him 
a fair and impartial bearing, permit him to interrogate 
the 'vitnesses, to hear the testimony, and in that manner 
establish his guilt. Unless the court can and will say 
that these conditions, so embodied in Rule 38, are cont-
rary to public policy and so void, then the defendant is 
bound by them, and the only question is whether they 
""ere complied with. 
CONCLUSION 
It is upon this question and upon this question alone 
that the plaintiff seeks to be reheard. The issues are 
momentous. The rights involved are multitudinous. 
We beg of the court not to permit the decision to stand 
in its present form. Far better it be, if the court so 
wills, that the plaintiff be summarily cut off upon some 
other ground, Bs for example laches or waiver as urged 
by the defendant, than that it be said that he was here 
given a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with 
the judicial requirements of this enlightened state. 
The real travesty on justice in this case is not in 
the award of damages pointed to by the Court, but rather 
in the subordination of the rights of plaintiff under 
this contract to the cavalier treatment given by the 
defendant. It exists in the approval voiced to the con-
clusions reached by the defendant, and in the blessing 
accorded to the manner of the termination of plaintiff's 
employment. 
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Particularly it exists in permitting the defendant, 
a great and wealthy corporation, to violate and ignore 
the plain import of its obligations under the contract 
and to deprive the plaintiff, by that farce they called 
a hearing, of the job security so zealously sought to be 
safeguarded by the provisions of Rule 38. 
Plato argued that the great and worthy had a duty 
to the public proportionate to these gifts. We do not 
so approach the matter, but do argue that the defend-
ant's employees have the right to require it to live up 
to its contractual obligations to them, and the right to 
expect the courts to enforce those obligations, painful 
though it may be. 
Mr. Justice Henriod states the principle here in-
volved in a way that cannot be improved upon in the 
case of Creamer v. 0. U. R. & D. Co., Utah, 242 P. 2d 575, 
as follows : -
"Our sympathies extend to plaintiff, but 
we must subordinate it, if in the honoring of it, 
we uproot the principle that there can be no re-
covery if no legal duty has been violated." 
The converse of this of necessity is true. Sym-
pathies must be subordinated if in honoring them vio-
lence is done to the principle that there shall he no wrong 
without a remedy. Plaintiff here was wronged when 
he was discharged without first having a fair and im-
partial hearing, without having the opporunity of in-
terrogating the witnesses against him, without having 
the right to hear their testimony, and without his guilt 
being establish6d at the hearing. 
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\\Te sinrer-?ly apologize if anything we here have· 
said seerns offensiYe to anyone. Certainly it was not 
so intended. Presenting the arguments on petitions 
for rehearing constitutes the most difficult task the 
"'Titer ever undertakes, because they of necessity are 
directed again~t the logic and reasoning of members 
of the court. \\" e can, however, honestly disagree with-
out such disagreement militating in any way against 
out respect for those w·ho judge us, and it is in that 
spirit that this petition and brief is submitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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